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The Technology of Public Goods, Externalities,
and the Exclusion Principle
Charles R. Plott, California Institute of Technology
and Robert A. Meyer, University of California,
Berkeley
Presented heret are some notions which we hope will help researchers in
their attempts to model various aspects of the complex situations which,
currently, come tinder the heading of 'externality problemS." Roughly,
the major theoretical idea is to exploit the advantages of separating into
different structural models the consumer-based activities of consumption
and acquisition and the producer-based activities of production, market-
ing, and revenue collection. The links between these activities can then
be used to characterize types or classes of externality problems.
Before continuing, we offer the reader two serious disclaimers. First,
we offer no hard results (theorems). In fact, we do not even argue to a
specific set of conclusions. Of course, implicit, as well as explicit, in our
discussion is our belief that the currently accepted views of høw one might
go about modeling externality problems are too narrow in scope. Second,
we offer no detailed example which would indicate that our classification
really works. We simply address some points of view which we find help
us in our attempts to lay things out in a coherent manner. %Ve have at-
tempted to streamline the ideas to fit within standard mathematical eco-
nomics constructions, so that it is possible to use standard tools in ap-
plications. The ideas allow attention to be focused on special aspects of
externality modeling, thereby allowing, to some degree, specialization of
research efforts.
Production is the only basic activity in the standard characterization
of a public good [5]. Consumption is not a separate activity since it occurs
automatically with production. If an irritant consumed by a person
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reaches him by means of some chain of events, e.g. irritant consumed
depends upon the amount of smoke reaching him and thus upon the
amount of smoke emission from the source, = then the utility
function is simply relabeled. The intermediate consumption variables
are eliminated and utility is expressed as a function of the amount of
smoke produced at the source, e.g. Rather than the
several variables "irritant 1 consumes, irritant 2 consumes, ..., smoke at
the source," we only have the latter, "smoke at the source."
The fact that there is only one variable involved in the standard model
has an immediate and important consequence. Within models that have
this attribute, a researcher is not free to interpret actions taken by a re-
ceptor as an expression of preference. Any given receptor must realize that
the effects on total supply and, thus on his utility, of any action taken by
him, depends critically upon the action taken by other receptors. Thus,
decisions made by him may reflect both his preference and his expecta-
tions about the decisions of others, rather than his preference alone. Such
expressions cannot be expected to properly guide output decisions. The
current efforts at finding a solution such as outlined in [3], [7], and [9],
involve some type of pseudo-price mechanism (Lindahi prices) which, by
clever means, extracts the true preference from the consumer. This
preference then serves as the basis for output decisions. These procedures
are most complicated and in view of the complexities may never have
applied manifestations. Of course, our speculations along these lines are
based on current theoretical discoveries.2
This conception of a public good is so broad it comes dangerously
close to being empty in content. Almost any problem can be called a
public goods problem. One may then inquire about changes in institu-
tional arrangements which assure that the choices of magnitudes made by
the choosing agents are coordinated in a manner such that the system
equilibria are Pareto optimal. The lack of coordination resulting in the
non-Pareto optimal behavior of the system can always be identified as the
lack of institutions within the system which would assure Pareto optimal
equilibria. The failure of the necessary institution to be voluntarily forth-
coming can then be called a "public goods" problem in cases where the
system has the proper "convexity" properties. This last sentence is a
major point made by Arrow [1].
Let us carry this argument a little further. A monopoly equilibrium
is not Pareto optimal (under reasonable conditions). In fact, it can be
shown that under a wide class of conditions, consumers could collectively
bribe the monopolist to price according to marginal cost. The resulting
contract could make both the monopolist and the consumers better off.
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Why do such contracts fail to arise naturally thus eliminating the mo-
nopoly (or replacing it by a cooperative)? Because the contract is a public
good. All consumers benefit from the contract but it is to their strategic
advantage to withhold, in hopes that the other consumers will finance
the project or at least take on a bigger share.
The point is that the monopoly problem can actually be viewed as a
public goods problem. It would appear, in fact, that any equilibrium
which is not Pareto optimal can be viewed as a public goods problem
by definition. The problem is that the public good, the institution that
would yield Pareto optimal change, is not forthcoming. While this view
may be useful in many cases, it would appear that some effort should be
expended in developing concepts, or characteristics of models, which, in-
dependent of optimality properties, can be identified as involving exter-
nalities. It is upon this "technology" of externality and public goods re-
lationships that we wish to focus.
Two Examples
Before continuing, we will present two examples that motivate almost
everything we have to say about the exclusion principle. The examples
indicate the delicate interaction between the outcome of a market-type
process and the legal-institutional setting. They also serve as examples,
within our framework, of how and why traditional solutions to external-
ity problems, which come under the heading "internalization of costs,"
seem to work. The theme is that property rights can sometimes be used
to repair social institutions (or lack of institutions) which are "ineffi-
cient."
Demsetz {6] claims that Canadian Indians learned that beavers' hutches
could be [armed. If the kill on a pond was too great, the stock of beavers
would be exhausted; this, as it turns out, was actually beginning to hap-
pen due to an increased demand for their pelts. Consequently, ponds were
marked according to the tribe that claimed [arming rights. One could say
that a title to a pond was established according to who discovered the
pond. The one who owned the pond had available to him the beavers
that were there. For a hunter, there are two alternatives:
a1 = hunt only those ponds marked as his;
a2 = hunt any pond that he comes upon.
VVe can represent this problem, with a little imagination, in terms of
a two-person noncooperative game. The game is reminiscent of the well-
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known prisoner's dilemma problem. The payoff matrix (see Figure 1)
gives the number of beavers obtained per year by each hunter as beaver
kill for I, beaver kill for II.
Figure 1
H
a1 a2
a1 (5,5) (3,6)
a2 (6,3) (4,4)
If both hunters follow a1, no hutch is hunted twice and the equilib-
'rium stock of beavers- is sufficiently large to allow an annual kill of 10.
The hunters would receive 5 each. If either person hunts both types of
ponds, the equilibrium stock is reduced to a level where the annual kill
is 9. The hunter following a2 gets 6 and the other receives 3. With both
following a2 the stock is reduced (due to overkill) to a level which only
yields a harvest of 4 each. Because of the prisoner's dilemma attribute of
the game, the solution if both follow a dominance principle is (a2,
General agreement arose, however, that if I violated the territory of
II, then II had the right to exercise certain claims to property possessed
by I—he could seek remedy. This change in the institutional structure
surrounding the exchange relationship results in a different game. The
new game is outlined below.
Let
= abstain from invading other's property; not,
if invaded, exercise rights;
a0 invade;
P2 if invaded, abstain from the exercise of rights.
The strategies and payoffs are displayed in Figure 2.
The structural payoff of the game dictated by the physical technology
is the same as before but the institutional technology has changed. The
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game has been expanded according to the following rules governing
propeity rights: the invaded has tile right to take from tile oilier indi-
vidual an amount equal to his own 'loss" (5 minus the harvest he actually
obtained) plus a penalty Cost of one beaver.
Notice tile only Nash equilibrium of the game is for both players to
use tile strategy 'Thus, if we can depend upon tile outcome being
a Nash equilibrium, then by constructing penalties for rights vioiations
—aitering the rules of the game—we can make sure the efficient outcome
is automatically achieved by the system. lii other words, au appropriate
specification of property rights has provided a resolution of the prisoner's
dilemma.
The second example has features which are a little Closer 10 those
economists have dealt with tinder the heading of social costs and or ex-
ternalities, even though some major features of the private goods case are
present. We can, affectionately, call the games STEAL and PROPERTY.
first view a game the structure of which is outlined by the accom-
panying "tree" and normal form.
The first player is a seller, player I, who can make his goods available
(act 0) or refrain from exposing them to the market (act N). Tue second
player, II, is the customer. He has thi'ee alternatives in case the goodS
(5,5) (5,5) (6,3) (6,3)
(5,5) (5,5) (3,6) (3,6)
(3,6) (6,3) (4,4) (6,2)
(3,6) (6,3) (2,6) (4,4)
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Figure 3
(5,5)
(0,9)
11
'I
d
C
[I.
ii
C
V
are available. He can appropriate them for himself and pay for them (act
TP, which stands for take and pay), he can appropriate them for himself
and not pay for them (act Ti), or he can fail to act (f). Now, if act N is
chosen, or acts 0 and f are chosen, no 'trade" takes place and player I
keeps his goods (valued to him at 4) and player II keeps the money
(valued to him at 4). If I plays 0 and II plays TP, I gets the money
(valued to him at 5) and II gets the goods (valued to him at 5). Suppose,
however, that I plays 0 and II plays TP. Then I loses the goods (ending
up with nothing, which he values at 0) and II gets goods and money (total
Tp I
0 5,5 0,9 4,4
N 4,4 4,4 4,4
I
Figure 4
II
C
I
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value to him of 9) without worry, since, in this game, I cannot "seek
remedy."
If we can be assured that individual II will always choose in accord
with a dominance law and that I believes this also, then, from this de-
sign, we shall obtain a perfectly unambiguous outcome. Simply look at
the game in normal form, as displayed. The dominant strategies are
(N, TP). Under this institutional arrangement the goods would never be
offered. The structure of the institutions together with our behavioral
law (the dominance principle) assures this. This system is "inefficient"
[the Pareto optimals are (5, 5) and (0, 9)].
Notice we have a feature of particular interest. A social system organ-
ized along the lines modeled by the game STEAL will operate ineffi-
ciently—the outcomes are not Pareto optimal. Now, is there an "exter-
nality" involved? Is there a "divergence of social benefits from private
benefits"? Yes. The social benefit of l's action is 1(5 — 4 = 1), while the
private benefit is —4. In the traditional jargon, we would say that I would
undertake a level of his activity below the "optimum amount" (he would
offer nothing). Is there a divergence of social cost from private cost? The
answer is yes. The social cost of II's action is 4 (a benefit of —4 to
I), while the private cost is 0. In the traditional jargon we would say that
II undertakes too much of his activity (of taking without paying).
Now, let us alter the game of STEAL a little and turn it into a game
of PROPERTY. Suppose we give I the right to seek remedy in the form
of damages, should he want to, in cases where he has made his goods
available to II, and II in turn has appropriated them without paying I.
The game represented by the tree below is the same as STEAL with the
exception of a new move which, depending upon previous moves, may
become open to player I. This new move involves his right to seek (R),
or not seek (R), "remedy" for the previous actions of II. If II plays TP
and I, in turn, seeks remedy, the "courts" will return the goods to I and
fine II an amount equal to the money he has. The payoff is thus (4, 0).
If is chosen by I, then II keeps both the goods (valued to him at 5),
and the money (valued to him at 4), while I gets nothing. The payoff
then is (0, 9). See accompanying figures.
From the normal form we can see that OR is dominant for I. Player II,
however, has no dominant strategy, so if the only admissible behavioral
law is dominance, PROPERTY has no solution. It does have a solution
if we can rely on II to follow a one-step conjectural variation. If he pos-
tulates that I will follow the dominant strategy, then II has a dominant
strategy in this conjectured context. The solution is (OR, TP) with the
Pareto optimal payoff of (5, 5). If we can rely on a simple behavioral law
-I
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Figure 5
(4,0)
(0,9)
then we are able to use legal institutions to transform an inefficient mode
of organization, STEAL, into an efficient mode of organization, PROP-
ERTY.
There are several morals to the story. First, if there is a principle called
the exclusion principle, it is likely to involve some interrelationship be-
tween behavioral laws and institutional structures. In the case displayed
in Figures 5 and 6, the interrelation is a connection between budget con-
straints. Secondly, calling the problem one of a "lack of markets" due to
a lack of sufficient number of participants, as Arrow [I] does, seems to be
a gross oversimplification. In the case presented here, there was no ap-
parent "small number" problem as a reader of Arrow might be led to
believe. We simply needed to alter the institutional technology.
Finally, representing the problem as one of 'transaction costs," as
Dernsetz tends to do, also seems to be glossing over some important fea-
tures. There are several different ways by which one could introduce
transactions costs into games such as PROPERTY so as to cause piob-
lems. For example, if the payments accruing to I as a result of remedy
were reduced by a sufficiently large enforcement fee, the dominance ia-in-
ciple could not be applied or used to guarantee an efficient outcome.
Exactly how one goes about translating various altered organizational
forms into something called transactions costs is not clear at all.
"ATe do not intend to imply that there are no "costs" of reorganization.
I
.(4,4)
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I
TP f
OR 5,5 4,0 4,4
5,5 0,9 4,4
N 4,4 4,4 4,4
There are likely to be costs which must be borne by someone and tile
covering of these costs does present a type of public goods problem. Both
I and II benefit in tile reorganization from STEAL to PROPERTY, but
the pattern of resulting benefits is very sensitive to the organizational
parameters. Consequently, it is not obvious that the altered form will be
forthcoming. We are not addressing the problem of how tue situation
• might thus evolve. We only note that lumping "organization" together
• with other things in a general category called "problems (itle to trans-
actions costs' precludes a study of the independent features of each.
• Models that (teal with the technology of externality relationships should
be separated from models and theories that deal with the evolution of
• that technology.
Some Economic Quantities and Relationships
The examples above capture many aspects of our point of view. The idea
is to take various aspects of "institutions," put them together in a mait-
nei- which, cleverly taking advantage of a behavioral law, assures that tile
process outcome will lie in some class of outcomes which have been pt'e
designated as acceptable. We turn, now, to a consideration of institutions.
In particular we consider those applicable to "market"- or "economic"-
related situations. We ignore situations which involve the problem of
"publicness" of organization. That is, we do not address a theory of how
organization evolves [141.
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Now, as the reader probably suspected all along, we are not going to
discuss real institutions. We shall study mathematical representations of
institutions. Actually, we shall not even study the representation of any
specific set of institutions at all; we shall study mathematical structures
which (1) seem capable of capturing the "essence" of the major attributes
of certain classes of institutions, (2) use forms tyl)ical of economic models,
so that the concepts can be applied within standard models, and (3) ap-
pear to decompose tile natural links among economic activities, allowing
public goods to be viewed with respect to the link(s) where problems
arise. It is at these links that we suspect the search for real "corrective
measures" should concentrate.
Consumption and Appropriation
The links we seek first are those related to the consumer—tile consump-
tion and appropriation activities. It is convenient for us to depart from
the standard model where consumption, ownership and use are not sepa-
rated. In doing so, we identify a variable c4  0, i = 1, 2 n, which
we will call the COflsumed quantity commodity of i, and variables
 0,
= 1, 2, . . ., n, called tile appropriated quantity of i. These variables are,
at this point, scalars, and tlley should be thought of and labeled with re-
spect to a particular individual.
Consumed quantities correspond to the idea of use or application
while appropriated quantities correspond to the idea of ownership or
claim. Tile distinction is important because many legal instruments are
founded on such distinctions and because the relationship between the
two concepts can serve as an interesting link in the externality chain.
In order to explore this distinction we postulate the existence of a con-
sumption technology, C(c, x)  0. The vectors c, x are the consumed afl(l
appropria ted amounts, respectively. The vector of consumed amounts
affects utility, i.e., U(c), and the consumer adjusts both c and x to fllaXi-
mize U(c) subject to C(c, x)  0 plus additional constraints (such as the
budget constraint). The expression simply says that the limits of one's
consumption activities are set by his activities of appropriation.
There are lots of diffei-ent ways to think about tile C'S an(l tile X'S. A
natural distinction might be a flow vs. stock distinction, Wilere ColiStimp-
don is a flow.3 A service vs. goods distinction could also be used. l'lie
idea of attributes as discussed in [111 being represented by tue c's, wii lie
purchased commodities are represen ted by the x's is also appealing. No-
tice tllat for purposes of nlodeling one may or may not want to identify
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each of the c's with a particular x. For example, if c1 is apple eating while
x1 is apple ownership, there seems to be some direct relationship between
x1 and c1, perhaps independent from the other consumption activities and
ownership activities. This closed system aspect is clearly not a necessary
restriction. Suppose the consumer is interested in the beauty of his home
as indexed by, say, the number of times per month that he receives com-
pliments about it. Call this number c1. The variables x1, x2, x3 could
reflect his contracts pertaining to the relative frequency of painting the
house, washing the outside and supplementing any paint used with ad-
clitives. The point of this example is that the seeming independence be-
tween the c and the x's is absent. A given level of c1 may be attainable
by several different combinations of the x's.
There are some Potential advantages of dwelling upon the distinctions
made here. First, the idea of ownership or appropriation can be con-
necteci with an act performed by someone. This connection will become
important in the next section where the possibility of forced ownership
is considered, and also later when we discuss the exclusion principle.
Secondly, delineations found in legal institutions about the basis and
extent of rights are hard to mirror within the standard public goods
model unless one is willing to tolerate an endless proliferation of the
dimensions of the commodity space. The distinction between consump-
tion and appropriation might do a better job. Legal instruments some-
times base rights on theoi-etical distinctions about payment and possession
as embodied in the concept of title. The act of acquiring ownership con-
veys certain rights to the owner. By virtue of being an owner, an individual
has the right to take certain actions regardless of how others feel about it.
Rights can also be founded on distinctions other than that of title. They
can be based on the effects of actions. I may not have the right to take
any action which causes you to experience certain types of discomforts
regardless of your perhaps peculiar preferences and regardless of the pat-
tern of ownership. The ownership of a gun does not carry with it the right
to shoot people.
Rights which are defined in terms of the admissible actions afforded by
ownership can be modeled as constraints on the consumption technology.
These rights, when considered in conjunction with other institutions as
well as the physical environment, wotild define, for every pattern of
ownership (the amounts of the various goods appropriated), a consump-
tion possibilities set. For example, if I own land I have the right to build
any of the structures consistent with local building codes, regardless of
how others feel about it. These form a consumption possibilities set. If I
appropriate more land I expand alternative building possibilities accord-
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ingly. A change in building codes would be a change in rights and can
be captured in the model by a change in the set of building possibilities
associated with any given land ownership.
In reality it would seem that this class of rights is important since
some attitudes are bound to be ignored in actual policy applications.
Any small thing we do might offend someone. Dales [4] claims to have
searched hard for a purely private good before settling on a real example
—slippers. Even this homely example is contained in a paragraph where
a paper titled "Costume as a Means of Social Aggression" is cited.
Rights which are conceptually intertwined with ideas of "effects," such
as "damage" and or "influence" are related to the "taxes" and "bribes"
proposed as solutions to the externality problem. Payment by person A
should offset at the margin any influence exerted on person
B who has the right to be free from such influences. A problem with this
approach is that "utilities," which in some sense would provide a basis for
all concepts of influence, are not observed. More seriously, they might
not, and probably do not, in any meaningful sense, even exist. However,
if we have U(c) where c is observed—perhaps by convention where we,
the court, or the law, can arbitrarily provide a definition—then, there
exists something to work with. As we attempt to characterize the nature
of problems and or model the effects of proposed remedies, the obvious
magnitudes available for our use are the derivatives dc1/dx3 and
We can seek ways, perhaps by following the leadership of the courts, to
place values on magnitudes like In the case of dx,/dx1 we have
the natural value of P,(dx,/dx,) when exists, since it is a type of oppor-
tunity cost. Suppose I ruined some of your x1, thereby causing you to
adjust x2; the damage, then, could serve as a natural clefini-
tion for the extent of my liability. Of course, if this number were used
as the magnitude of liability in a decentralized pricing system, it could
induce inefficiencies, but analysis of that problem introduces the different
sphere of welfare economics in general.
We would like to pursue a general theory of consumption technology
as influenced by legal parameters. The reason we do not do so is because,
at this point, we have nothing profound to say on the subject. We do
offer, however, one general characterization: the consumption technology
is characterized by total rejectability in which case C(c, x) < 0 can be re-
written as C(c) — x

0. The idea is similar to free disposability. If you
are stuck with more of the product, you can get rid of it without cost. In
cases of total rejectability, a person would never make an effort to own
less of a variable (unless he could sell it at a positive price). He can simply
proceed to "dump" the "trash" without effort or cost. An increase in own-
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ership does not automatically affect the consumption pattern. There
cannot be too much of anything. Consequently, total rejectability is, for
purposes of finding externalities, not at all interesting since it is the lack
of rejectability which can cause problems. However, for purposes of cor-
recting externalities the idea is very important.
Now, clearly the concept of total rejectability is rather gross. It could
easily be refined into concepts which allow for rejectability or lack of
rejectability of certain select quantities. Perhaps it is possible to say some-
thing specific about institutions which foster nonrejectability or even
develop a theory along these lines. We have not done so. One thing is
clear, however. If all consumption technologies were characterized by
perfect rejectability, there could never be a problem with external dis.
economies.
Before moving on, let us reflect on the concept of the appropriated
quantity. This concept allows concepts pertaining to what one does at
the consumption level to be separated from concepts and theories about
how one appropriates or acquires ownership. Exactly what constitutes
appropriation can be thought of as being determined by social conveii-
dons and or legal conventions. It sometimes involves overt actions. If 1
file a document proclaiming ownership of a property, then I have appro-
it. My signature on a contract may signify appropriation. If I
attach a label, e.g., if I brand a cow, the appropriation is signified. On
the other hand, the act of appropriation might be rather circumstantial.
If I am in the theater during a show or not I paid), it is as-
sumed that I watched (appropriated). If I carry an item from a store
(whether I paid or not), it is assumed that I appropriated it (claimed
title)—even though I intended to bring it back.
Later, the concept of appropriation will play a fundamental role in
our discussion of the exclusion principle. We will want to directly con-
nect concepts of liability and or payment to the activity of appropria-
tion. If I appropriate the pair of shoes or if I declare ownership over the
pair of shoes, then I am automatically liable to the storekeeper for the
amount posted on the price tag. Of course, in case I appropriated quietly,
it might be difficult for the storekeeper to identify me as the one who is
liable to him, but this is another story.
Appropriation and Availability
We now consider the activities of a producer or supplier. We will postu-
late two basic activities here. One is the act of production and to it is
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attached a produced quantity, The other is the activity of distribution
or making available quantities, in terms of what is produced, to the other
agents in the economy. The last concept, that of available quantities,
qk = where  0, are interpreted with respect to,
and are unique to, each of the consumers (rn in number) or other eco-
nomic agents. Notice now that we have distinguished between appropri-
ated quantity, which, in principle, is controlled by the consumer in ques-
tion, and the quantity available to that consumer, which, in principle, is
controlled by the producer. We have also identified a variable termed
the produced quantity. This latter variable will be examined in detail in
the next section.
Let us pursue the relationship between appropriated quantities and
available quantities. In general, the relationship must always
hold. For example, if I am in a store, the amount of a commodity avail-
able to me is (presumably) the entire inventory. I can appropriate up
to that amount, depending upon my own strategy in conducting my af-
fairs. A park which is open 10 hours a clay is available to me in that
amount even though I might appropriate only one hour. The point is
that appropriation and availability are, at points, independent concepts.
The idea of access and opportunity, as opposed to ownership, can be
found repeatedly in legal discussions. It is hoped that the distinction here
will capture some of the complexities. We do not want to say that the
available amount is necessarily what you pay for or is necessarily the
amount you have appropriated. This would leave us no room within
which we could characterize stealing, for example, or lack of rights en-
forcement or liability enforcement. Each of these involves the phenome-
non of taking or appropriating without payment. Consequently, to the
extent that these types of divergence between private and social costs are
of interest, we need separate concepts.
Of particular interest is the case where a distinction between appro-
priation and availability cannot be made. The representation of this
case is = and can be termed a situation of forced appropriation
or lack of appropriation. This is the case where the concept of ownership
begins to fade. If something is available to you, then it is yours. The
example of smog seems relevant. We could also mention Mead's bees or
Coase's rabbits. The point of both examples is that the courts decided
that if the creatures are on your property then they are yours, even if you
didn't want them. You acquired title through no act of your own. The
ambiguity is underlined by the fact that we have not specified who con-
trols x and who controls q, in the case of forced ownership. The agent who
controls one must necessarily control both. We chose to discuss the issue
-
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on the presumption that the supplier, rather than the consumer, controls
the variable. We could have just as easily called it forced availability,
rather than forced appropriation, and postulated that the consumer con-
trolled the variable; or we could always call it forced appropriation and
label the agent who controls the variable the supplier.
As it turns out, the Mead and Coase examples are of interest because
not only are they presented as though the relationship holds between
the appropriated and the available amounts, but also because nonre-
jectability is present. If, for example, the receptor could avoid the effects
of smog by some (costless) means, some of the complexities of the prob-
lem might be avoided. The usual public goods cases can be viewed as
involving both nonrejectability and forced appropriation.
A convenient feature of the distinction is that on the one hand it al-
lows a characterization of the exclusion principle which will be based
on the variable and on the other hand it makes possible certain types
of jointness in supply which are based upon the It is to these distinc-
tions that we turn in the next section.
Availability and Production
We now consider the relationship between the vector of available
amounts, and the scalar amount produced, In general, we will
represent the relationship by the vector valued function a),
where the vector a is a representation of some arbitrary, nonspecified set
of controls (real or abstract). The producer can control the amounts
which become available to the various individuals by altering and a.
Just a glance at the general form T(.
,
-) indicates that a great number
of forms of this mapping would make economic sense, and thus might
be applicable for purposes of modeling. For example, one aspect of the
usual private goods model where there are m individuals, can be cap-
tured by postulating controls of the form

0, = I,
together with
T(yk, a) = (yk)a (alyk, . - - , amyk) (qk', - - . ,
This simply says that the supplier is physically able to make a given pro.
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duced amount, available at the individual level in any pattern
such that
qk' =
Actually, the private goods case above is a special case of what can be
called perfect selectivity of supply. We say that T(.
,
.) allows perfect se-
lectivity of supply in case the range of the function (it maps on to) is the
nonnegative orthant of the Euclidian rn-space (a type of invertability as-
sumption). That means that any point in the shaded area of the accom-
panying figure could be achieved by a proper adjustment of the controls.
The producer is able to discriminate between receptors even though some
discrimination may be costly. For example, the distribution (0, 5, 0, 1, 1)
may take enormous amounts of Yk' while all other points are achievable
via the private goods form of T(.
,
We underline the note that perfect selectivity of supply can operate
independently of the other concepts. The case of a private goods world
with free disposability can be viewed as a case of perfect rejectability,
nonforced appropriation and perfect selectivity of supply. We can take
the same example and do away with the free disposal. For example, con-
sider something like Limburger cheese which must be stored at home. If
you own it, you cannot simply ignore the effects of the ownership on
your consumption activities—it simply stinks. Yet there is perfect selec-
tivity of supply (the supplier is able to remove it as you approach the
counter, even though it would be available to any other customer). 9
Another example might be interesting. Consider a big, fast Fellow who
supplies handbills on the street. He is fast, so has perfect selectivity in
Figure 7
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supply (he can reach anyone and or everyone). He is also big (with a
slight whiff of ugliness), so there is forced appropriation. If he makes a
handbill available to you, then you smile and take it. Now, if it is im-
possible to throw it away (without considerable effort), you also have
nonrejectability. So, here is a seemingly private goods case which has
many of the aspects of externalities. There are also many reasonable cor-
rective measures for this problem which would not automatically evolve
from our usual manner of modeling such processes: supply trash cans;
make him stand in one spot; make him smile; give people tennis shoes
so they can outrun him. This final suggestion, we are compelled to add,
seems no less relevant to us than the several possible suggestions which
involve the use of cost-benefit ratios.
Part of the existing models of public goods can be captured by another
special form of T(. , .). Suppose, where 1 is the vector of ones, we have
T(yk, a) = (yk)1 = (yk,
. . . , = . . . ,
Here we have something that looks like the traditional pullic gootis case
of q1,) = . . . , = = Yk The range of T(.,.) as shown is simply
the diagonal. We can call this a case of no selectivity of supply.
A example falling within this class is the case of the park.
Park service is necessarily available to everyone in equal amount and that
amount is the total supply. The park service can clearly l)e supplied free
of forced availability, the case of x,,!  q1.1 (we (10 not consider crowding).
We have then the idea that appropriation by one does noi ieduce
the amount available to others. Of course, this verbal description is fre-
taken as a definition of "pure public goods.' We can see fiom
the accompanying structure, however, that there is no forced availability
r
I
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P1
and no nonrejectability. In fact, in this case, it is possible for the exclu-
sion principle to be operative as well. Even though the park has aspects
of publicness, there is no necessary market failure. ai
The usual case of national defense should also be considered here.
Presumably, there is no selectivity of supply but there is forced avail-
ability and (perhaps) nonrejectability. Although, it would seem to be easy
enough (things being what they are) to expose oneself to any degree of a
risk necessary to perfectly offset safety supplied by defense. If this is true
then nonrejectability would not apply.
Of course, the examples of T(.
, .) discussed so far do not exhaust the
possibilities. Consider, for example, the range shown on Figure 9. The no
idea is that availability to some types of individuals cannot be separated.
Consider an airline with two close routes (there is only one control pa-
rameter, a, that takes only 2 values) between two mountains. The people
situated between the two routes are going to have noise available to them
as long as there is any supply and regardless of what the company does.
However, if the company chooses route 1, some people are far enough an
away to receive no noise at all. The same is true with route 2. tio
Til
it 1
501
rat
Th
fur
There appears to be no utility in pursuing these structures (which by
have been called cases of "parametric jointness" [16J)4 at this time. How- tile
ever, the alterations in the form of T(.,.) could potentially provide ye-
hides for capturing the idea of transaction costs. There may be real costs
(perhaps parameterized by a) in making a supply available to one person bet
without making it available to others. firs
Before leaving the subject, we can offer two general concepts which can for
reduce speculation over admissible forms of T(.,.). We say supply is de- two
plecable in case pay
Figure 9
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T(yk, a)1
 yk for all (yk, a)
anti nondepletable in case for all Yk
T(yk, a)  (yk)1 (y,, . . . , yk) (qk', . . ,
and for some
T(yk, a*) = (yk)1.
The idea of depletability is simply that the amount produced must be
no less than the sum of the amounts available to individuals. The tradi-
tional private goods model serves as an example. Nondepletability means
that the amount available to each individual is limited only by the total
supply. As an example, consider the case of one evening of TV produc-
tion and broadcast. Suppose the station controlled scramblers on each
individual's set. In this case, there would be perfect selectivity of supply
and nondepletability, since making the program available to an addi-
tional individual would not reduce the amount available to anyone else.
The entire evening broadcast would be available to each individual.
The Exclusion Principle
The exclusion principle is probably the most elusive of all the ideas
presented here. In fact, from time to time, we have wondered whether
it is a principle at all, since we were unable to obtain a really satisfactory
characterization. The game examples given in the introduction do give
some hints when taken in conjunction with the concepts thus far elabo-
rated.
Here, the dominance principle can be used to considerable advantage.
The structure we will propose involves the postulation of a liability
function which depends directly upon an individual's act of appropria-
tion. If this function is properly constructed then we will be assured
a by virtue of the dominance principle that a given individual will act in
tile proper manner.
Before making the idea more precise, let us return to the game of
:s PROPERTY. We have complicated it in order to make clear the analogy
n between it and our abstract concept. The seller, player I, will have the
first move. He has the alternative to offer, 0, or not to offer, N, the goods
n for sale. If 0 is played at the first move, the second player has a move with
two alternatives. He can appropriate (take) the goods, (T), and make a
payment available to I, (A); or, he can take the goods, (T), and not make
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the payment available to person I, (A). We ignorehere the option of not
appropriating any of the goods, so he has two alternatives: (TA) and
(TA). If he plays (TA), then player I has the option of collecting the
payment (C) or not collecting (C). Tue former induces a payoff of (5, 5),
since I gets the money, valued to him at 5, and II gets the goods which
are valued to him at 5. if C is chosen, then I loses the goods and II gets
both the goods and the money.
If player II plays TA then I has the option of filing suit (R—for seek
remedy) or not filing suit (R). The former leads to a payoff of (5, 0)—
player I receives damages of the foregone value of the sale (to him), and
player II pays the damages and a fine. If player I does not file suit, then
II gets everything.
F
a
C
a
Player I has the dominant strategy of (OCR)—he offers the goods,
collects when possible and files suit when collecting is not possible. Player
II has no dominant strategy unless he conjectures that player I will play
a dominant strategy. In this case, he always plays (TA). The outcome, a
of course, is Pareto optimal. a
The key idea in Figures 10 and 11 is the interrelationship between the
act of taking (appropriating) and the options that automatically become r
available to the other players as a result. In the traditional private goods a
model where is the price of the good, the payment, L(x) = is
simply a linear function of the amount consumed (x). In our jargon, we
would say, where x is the amount appropriated, that the amount is
money macic available to the seller. That is, the act of appropriating
some amount will automatically induce a liability amounting to L(x) =
Of course, if the seller 'likes money" and also follows the dominance
Figure 10
(5,5)
I,
N'
.9)
principle, the individual can be assured that the seller will appropriate
all of the money macic available to him. If the individual can "steal" the
commodity, we would say that L(x) 0. That is, the individual's act of
appropriation was hot accompanied by an induced liability. Tue seller,
in this case, would have no alternatives available as a result of the first
person's act of appropri a ti on.
In general, and more abstractly, we suggest die use of a function L(xcL)
as a representation of the liability which results from appropriation. At
a general, level, would simply identify sonic set of actions. At a
more specific level, we suggest that be interpreted in terms of a
reduction in the amount of some given commodity (perhaps money) avail-
able to the appropriating larty, individual i. Furthermore, for our pm-.
poses, we can simultaneously view the absolute amount o L(x,!) as be-
coming available to the seller. We intend for this function, to cap.
ture what we call the circunislances of exclusion.
The liability function is intended to describe, in a sense, the potential
retaliations that one can experience as a result of his act of appropria-
tion. it could, in reality, take any number of interpretations, even though
R
e
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Figure 11
II
TA TA
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I
OCR 5,5 5,0
OCR 5,5 0,9
OCR 0,9 5,0
OCR 0,9 0,9
N 4,4 4,4
s,
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we have suggested that it is a reduction in the amount of something avail-
able to him, it could, however, represent a potential increase in the
amount of something which he is forced to appropriate and unable to a
reject: e.g., I am able to park in my neighbor's driveway (appropriate this
parking space), but as a result I am forced to tolerate more of his chil- v
dren's climbing on my car. The example is reminiscent of reciprocal
externalities. F
We have no general theory about exclusion, nor general forms char. o
acterizing the circumstances of exclusion, but we can make several ob- y
servations about particulars. First, the failure of exclusion might imply e
absolutely nothing about forced availability, nonrejectability, nondeplet- o
ability, etc. The case of "theft" described above is an excellent example e4
of a private good where exclusion is absent. It is also a case which, within
the traditional model, could not be separated. We can also see that the
property of nondepletability, i.e., that everyone can appropriate Uj) to
the produced quantity, need not be accompanied by the failure of ex-
clusion, Here, we need only consider a park, picnic area, or beach which
is privately owned. By suitable organizational arrangement, e.g., a big t
guard authorized to collect a fee if possible, and backed by laws govern- s
ing trespassing, the owner is assured that anyone who appropriates some a
of the amount available to him will incur the proper liability. In other u
words, from those who enter, the owner is assured of a proper fee. We ti
can worry about crowding, etc., but there appear to be ways of capturing
that phenomenon without destroying the nondepletability attribute we
have used in the characterization here. e
There are, of course, problems with this formulation of exclusion in the I
cases of forced availability. In these cases, there is really no act with o
which liability can be associated. As was mentioned above, it is here that
even the concept of appropriation and or ownership becomes unclear. ti
However, there is no need to follow the usual path and extend compli-
cations that arise in this case to all of the other cases. Things are corn- r
plicated enough as they are.
We can make the concept, L(x), a little less abstract by discussing some r
features of processes which would be implied by its use. First, the sup- c
phier must be aware of L(x). This implies that when L(x) becomes avail-
able, it is accompanied by some type of signal. In the game theory jargon,
the individual must be aware that it is his move. In some cases, tile signal
may occur almost naturally as part of the appropriation process. For ex-
ample, large discount stores frequently place purchases in a l)ag, then
staple the bag closed with the receipt of payment. Any customer who
is observed carrying merchandise which is not so labeled serves as a sig- re
nal to the supplier that certain options are available to him, e.g., col-
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lecting for the purchase. Coin-operated machines are excellent examples
of cases where the interrelationships between appropriation and liability
are so automatic as to be almost unnoticed. The coins in the machine at
the end of the day, in a very trivial sense, signal their availability to the
vendor. In some cases the knowledge about L(x) may not be automatic.
In fact, the knowledge may be acquired only after consiclei-able search.
For example, the actions available to you as a result of my appropriation
of an idea on which you have a patent may never be known to you unless
you "catch" me "using" it. In passing, we should observe that the knowl-
y edge of L(x) itself is of primary importance, as opposed to the knowledge
of who appropriated what and how much was appropriated. The knowl-
edge of these other aspects can be viewed as either secondary or indirectly
implied by the nature of L(x).
The second feature of processes implied by the use of L(x) is that L(x)
) really represents some thing or some things which are actually available.
After all, L(x) does represent some alternative form of retaliation, so it
.1 cannot be vacuous or token. It does little good for someone to be liable
to you if it is impossible for some reason or another for you to collect. A
supplier who requires the deposit of a driver's license and/or credit card
e as part of a rental contract is attempting to assure himself that the agreed
r upon rate can actually be collected by him. In most cases discussed above,
e the thing represented by L(x) was some kind of monetary payment. This
g is a very natural instrument to use, because it can be readily transferred
e into something the seller desires. Other things could be involved. For
example L(x) might involve the ability to initiate criminal proceedings.
e It could involve civil proceedings in pursuit of damages, injunctive relief
h or review of official decisions. It might be the case, as it is with most
niarket models, that the terms of L(x) are set by the supplier himself in
the form of a price.
j. The point of the above discussions, for those interested in market cor-
rections, is that slight perturbations in institutions can be the means by
which the correction takes place. A small change in procedure, such as
e requiring a signature, might make the seller aware of his rights, and thus
correct an externality: simply providing an unambiguous set of retalia-
1- tory measures might do the trick.
11
Concluding Remarks
n
o What is a purely public good? In our jargon, it is characterized by non-
rejectability, forced availability and no selectivity in supply. What is a
1- purely private good? In our jargon, it is depletable, it may or may not
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involve nonrejectability, it may or may not have perfect selectivity of
supply, and the exclusion principle applies. Do all permutations and
combinations of our concept have a counterpart in reality? We have
absolutely no idea.
There is no real divergence between what we have done and what has
been developing in the literature. We have sought only to refine the
concept of "cost internalization" and the elimination of "unnecessary"
transactions costs. In doing so, we hope we have equipped the reader
with a point of view which helps him recognize some modes of attack
which may have otherwise gone unnoticed.
Perhaps we have been more preoccupied with noncooperative game
formulations than some readers would like, but we have not found the
characteristic function form of model useful when thinking about these
problems, even when it is generalized as in [2] and [19]. Models using the
characteristic function form of games collapse all variables, at the mdi-
vidual level, into one variable—the choice of coalition. The representa-
tion of institutions then must be introduced through the structure of
the "possibilities set" or "payoff set" associated with a coalition and the
closely associated description of an outcome of the game. Presumably,
when one starts at the extensive form, such as we have done, the model
can be collapsed to a characteristic function. But whether or not vari-
ous standard institutions or technologies have a useful and straightfor-
ward n4tural representation as a characteristic function is simply not
known. Some progress along these lines is evident. The interested reader
should consult, for example, [15], [17], [21], [23] and, especially, [8], for
examples where the technology is readily represented by a characteristic
function.
Along with our tendency at the structural level, to avoid cooperative
concepts, we have also avoided the use of solution concepts used typically
in models of the cooperative form. This is somewhat implicit in what we
have done, since the applicability of the concept we have used is limited
to the operation of a dominance principle. It also placed limits on the
type of formal apparatus we introduced. For example, we did not ex-
amine the type of institutions which would guarantee the existence of a
core in any associated game model. We chose not to try to isolate institu-
tions or technologies of this sort because we have serious reservations
about whether or not the core can actually be depended upon as an op.
erative behavioral proposition. We would aggressively pursue a theory
of those institutions which would guarantee the existence of a core, if
we were assured that existence of a core in the model was sufficient to
guarantee that the outcomes would be restricted to it in reality.
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We also diverge slightly from those, such as Drbze, Foley, Munch,
ci Roberts, Samuelson, and others, who have been developing the structure
e of the Linclahl equilibria. 'We have made no attempt to systematically in-
tegrate our concepts with a set-theoretic general equilibrium model.
Perhaps that can come later.
Footnotes
k
1. The research support [or C. R. Ploct provided by NSF grant No. GS-362I4 is grate.
e
fully acknowledged. The word "technology" used iii the title was adopted as a result of
comments niade by Robert Havcmati,
e 2. The most recent direct attack at placing sonic structure on this problem of prefer.
e ence revelation cais l)e found in Ledyard [12].
3. A model which capitalizes on distinctions along these lines cais be found at [10].
They regard pollution as a stock which acts as a parameter on the flow of consumption—
although they take ''utility" directly to represent consumption rather than some inter-
mediate variable like our variable. c.
f 4. This idea is also closely i'clatcd to (lie tYpe of jOintncSS investigated by Smith [22].
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COMMENT
Robert H. Haveman, University of Wisconsin
Tue paper by Plott and Meyei' is designed to a new chai'actci'i-
zation of the standard concepts of private goods, })ul)lic goods, and cx-
tei'nali ties. Al though this charactei'iza tion is based on the 1)crspective of
game theoi-y and carries with it all of the complexities of that view, the
I
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paper also has the flavor of a layman's guide to externality control. As
such it is either deceivingly simple or deceivingly complex.
The new characterization grows out of the perspective of game theory
in which the behavioral law, represented by the dominance principle, pre-
vails. Because such a framework and principle, together with a multi-
person game structure, is theoretically equivalent to the standard eco-
nomic model, Plott and Meyer offer no new theorems regarding market
failures. In this sense, the paper is but old wine in new bottles.
Having said this, however, I confess that Plott and Meyer do seem to
limited mileage out of their analysis of these phenomena. The cate-
gol-ies and concepts which they develop tend to focus attention on some
fundamental attributes of the market failure phenomena which may be
obscured by the standard neo-classical model. However, by dissecting
the public goods-externality their paper becomes a discus-
sion of the technology of externalities and public goods. Their justifica-
tion for this detailed look at mechanics is that good policy toward exter-
nalities requires a perception and evaluation of the full range of institu-
tional or policy correctives for a market failure.
To convey the flavor of the Plott-Meyei- approach, I will examine a
few examples of standard phenomena which, when looked at through
their glasses, somehow seem a bit richer than before. If this examination
does some minor violence to their framework, I am sure they will for-
give it.
First, the notion of private goods. To Plott and Meyer, a private good
is one in which the following characteristics are present:
• deplctab'lity—the suns of the amounts of a good which are made
available are no larger than the amounts produced. This is to be
set against nondepletability in which the amount of a good avail-
able to every individual is limited only by total supply.
• perfect selectivity—the provider of a good can target the good (or
bad) on whomever he desires.
• no forced appropriation—the individual does not have to take any
good made available to him—or alternatively, if the good is a bad
and he is forced to take it, lie can dispose of it at no real cost.
• a liability function exists—appropriation of the good results in an
immediate liability (it is this which substitutes foi- die exclusion
pIe in the Plott-Meyer framework).
At the other extreme, consider the notion of public goods. In the Plott-
Meyer framewoi-k, such goods have the following characteristics, whose
meaning can be inferred from the above definitions:
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• non-depletability
• no selectivity
• forced appropriations, hence,
• no liability function exists
• norejectabilily
Given these two polar cases, it is clear that the world of nonextreme
externalities lies somewhere between them. Indeed, it appears that if any
one of the characteristics of the private or public good cases are altered
(or more than one appears in any combination or permutation), some
phenomenon results which represents an externality-type market failure
which may or may not have a counterpart in the real world. A couple of
examples will illustrate this conclusion.
Consider first the phenomenon of theft as an external diseconomy. The
producer-supplier in this case is the robber with the victim being the
appropriator-consumer. In Plott and i\'Ieyer's jargon, there is no liability
function present in this case or, in other words, exclusion is absent.
Similarly, by the very nature of the case, there is no rejectability. More-
over, there is perfect selectivity by the supplier and forced appropriation.
Finally, the good is depletable. Looking at the problem in this way, then,
theft would be classified as a private good (or bad)—for example, there
is selectivity—except that the liability function is absent. Correction of
the market failure, then, requires an institutional change in which the
opportunity for redress is imposed. Viewing the problem in this context,
it is claimed, immediately focuses attention on the search for an insti-
tutional change to correct the absence of a liability function. It is the
technology of this case which points directly to the corrective policy.
As a second example, consider the handbill distributor clesciibecl by
Plott and Meyer—a case similar to theft. Again thei-e is no liability func-
tion even though there is forced appropriation. The pedestrian cannot
make the distributor pay for the inconvenience of taking the handbill.
Similarly, there is perfect selectivity, no rejectability, and depietabilily.
In this case a number of policy remedies are available and the task is to
choose the least costly of them (assuming equal effectiveness). A rule could
be imposed denying the distributor the right to force appropriation. For
example, he could be required to stand in one place. Or a rule could be
imposed requiring him to incur a liability equal to the marginal incon-
venience his action imposes. Or provision could be made for rejectabihity
by placing a trash can just beyond him. All of these institutional changes
would tend to turn an inefficient mode of social organization into an
efficient one. In each case, the nature of the change falls directly out of
-J
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the specific characteristics of the case, as distinguished by the Piott-Meyer
framework.
Having so characterized the Plott-Mayer framework, the question of
the benefits of this view of the world must be confronted. Tue first benefit
claimed by Plou-Meyer has already been alluded to: By focussing on the
detailed characteristics of the case of suspected market failure, a deeper
understanding of the externality problem and a clearer comprehension
of the full range of policy alternatives or institutional changes are ob-
tained. This statement, it should be noted, is both a plea for a compre-
hensive search and evaluation of available policy options (a la Baumol-
Oates) and a belief that their 'nuts and bolts" framework will be helpful
in undertaking that search and evaluation.
With respect to their plea, I have absolutely no quibble. To insist on
a full understanding of the institutions surrounding a market failure
problem prior to taking corrective action is unexceptional. Few econo-
mists would advocate anything but the need for a comprehensive search
for policy options and a careful examination of the benefits and costs of
each. Such a procedure would seem to follow directly from standard wel-
fare economic analysis and would be advocated by most careful public
administrators. Plott and Meyer's framework would seem to add little to
this l)rOl)Osition.
With respect to Plott and Meyer's belief regarding tile efficacy of their
framework, I do have a quibble. Surely, their perspective is helpful in
illuminating the case of small numbers extel-nahi ty problems. ihirougil
their framework, insights are conveyed—for example, in tile theft and
handbill examples discussed above—which a more gross statement re-
garding externalities would not be likely to reveal.
However, I am not at all convinced that tile Plott-Meyei framework
provides illumination in the case of large numbers externality i)rol)ie111s,
such as those which dominate discussions regarding environmental I)01
lution. Noi- am I convinced that an economist ot a policy makci- con-
fronted with a task of tile framing, say, federal water pollution control
policy would find the insights from their framework more llel1)fui thiaii
those stemming from tile standard welfare economics framework. Clearly
the range of possible policies and policy mixes is very large—cllaz-ges,
subsidies, regulations, prohibitions, assignment of property rights, and
combinations of any of these. Presumably, careful Witilill tile
standai-d welfare economic framework can point to tile correct polic'
mix. TIIC Plott-Meyer concepts of forced appropriation, rejectability, se-
lectivity and so on add little insight if any to tile design of optimal cx-
tei-nality policy where large numbers interactions exist. It is revealing
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that, in their paper, Plott and Meyer deal with no concrete environmen-
tal problem nor illustrate any large number externality problems for
which their framework would be either a complement or a substitute for
the standard analysis.
A second potential benefit of the Plott-Meyer framework is as a con-
tribution to the formal externality literature and to the modeling of
environmental problems. If I am correct regarding the lack of relevance
of their framework to most large number externalities problems, it is not
likely that it will contribute substantially to the success of modeling ef-
forts. As a contribution to the formal analysis of externalities, their
framework is enlightening. Their critique of Arrow's conclusion that the
problem is a lack of markets due to too small a number of participants
follows directly from their game theory framework. Similarly, their point
regarding Demsetz' focus on the role of transaction costs as the prime
cause of market failure is attributable to their framework and is helpful.
Finally, their framework does seem to illuminate some of the more
subtle characteristics of externality l)roblems which are not typically
noted. In the terms of their framework, external diseconornies are a prob-
lem only if nonrejectability is present. Similarly, rejectability must be
thought of as a continuous variable so that the closer the world is to the
pole of nonrejectability, the more serious the problem. Can we then
think of technological change to expand the possibilities for i-ejectability
or to reduce the cost of rejectability? In much the same way, viewing the
liability function as a continuous variable ranging from zero liability to
full liability is helpful in understanding the meaning of the exclusion
principle and in contemplating possibilities for "privatizing" goods.
In conclusion, then, I found the Plott-Meyer paper to be a mixed bag.
The framework which it sets out does convey some insights regarding the
process of externality generation. It is a frustrating paper, however, in
several regards. The tie to the standard externalities literature is never
made. For example, how do the notions of consumption and production
externalities fit into the Plott-Meyer framework? Is their framework help-
ful in distinguishing real from merely pecuniary externalities? Moreover,
it is not clear that the framework can really enlighten some real world,
real life externality cases—perhaps even in the environmental area. The
authors have yet to demonstrate the effective relevance of the framework.
As a final point, if various constellations of Plott-Meyer characteristics
yield a large, yet fInite, number of externality cases between pure public
and pure private goods, it should be possible to map corrective institu-
tional changes onto the set of cases. While this might be a worthwhile
effort, it has not been undertaken.
